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Abstract 
We analyze lifetime earnings histories of white males during 1960-2010 and categorize the labor force status of 
every worker as either working full-time, partially retired or fully retired. We find that the fraction of partially 
retired workers has risen dramatically (from virtually zero to 15 percent for 60-62 year olds), and that the 
duration of partial retirement spells has been steadily increasing. We estimate the response of retirement timing 
to variations in unemployment rate, inflation and house prices. Flows into both full and partial retirement 
increase significantly when the unemployment rate rises. Workers around normal retirement age are especially 
sensitive to variations in unemployment rate. Workers who are partially retired show a differential response to 
high unemployment rate: younger workers increase their partial retirement spell, while older workers accelerate 
their transition to full retirement. We also find that high inflation discourages full-time work and encourages 
partial and full retirement. House prices do not have a significant impact on retirement timing. 
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 “We have 10,000 baby boomers retiring every day. It’s time for us to get serious about ensuring that 
[major entitlement programs] are going to be there for them.” 
House Speaker John Boehner 
September 19, 2011 
I. Introduction 
Every day, about 10,000 people reach the age of 65 in the U.S. The rapid aging of the US 
population makes labor force attachment of older workers a key question for policymakers. What 
factors determine a worker’s exit from the labor force? While retirement decisions crucially 
depend on individual characteristics, such as health, work history, accumulated savings etc., 
macroeconomic factors such the state of the labor market, inflation rate, and housing prices can 
play a big role as well. How cyclical macroeconomic factors affect retirement timing is a 
question with immediate and far-reaching policy implications. 
The impact of macroeconomic forces on retirement timing is not unambiguous. On the 
one hand, adverse macroeconomic conditions can deplete household wealth. The life-cycle 
model predicts that households should optimally extend their working lives when their wealth 
unexpectedly declines. On the other hand, a weak labor market in a recession can induce early 
retirement if older workers become discouraged about the future job prospects. Similarly, a high 
rate of inflation can negatively affect the purchasing power of household wealth, which should 
encourage continued labor force participation. However, inflation can also lead to erosion of real 
wages thereby encouraging workers to retire earlier than they would otherwise. The response of 
retirement timing to inflation is of current importance, because some fear that the large balance 
sheet of the Federal Reserve may lead to out-of-control inflation in the future. Fluctuations in 
housing prices create yet another wealth effect for households. Real estate prices may 
significantly affect retirement timing because housing wealth is a major part of portfolios of the 
US middle class. This paper documents the dynamics of employment/retirement choices of older 
workers and estimates the sensitivity of retirement timing to unemployment, inflation and 
housing prices using the data from the past 50 years. 
Our analysis uses Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS) dataset of the Social Security 
Administration (SSA). This dataset includes comprehensive, administrative-quality information on 
the complete records of lifetime earnings of 1 percent of the U.S. population since early 1950s. The 
long time series enables us to exploit large variations in macroeconomic indicators. Furthermore, 
the large sample size based on administrative records lends more precision to our estimates.  
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We associate retirement with a permanent withdrawal from the labor force. This 
definition of retirement provides several advantages over defining retirement as Social Security 
benefit claiming age. First, defining retirement as permanent labor force exit is more accurate, 
since many individuals continue working even after claiming Social Security benefits. Second, 
our definition is more flexible. The available evidence (e.g., Ruhn, 1990) points to the fact that 
for many workers retirement is not a one-step process. The traditional career job followed by full 
retirement is becoming less of a norm. Instead, workers transition from career jobs to lower-
paying “bridge” jobs that they hold for a number of years after their career end date. Workers in 
career and bridge jobs may have different incentives and degrees of flexibility with respect to 
retirement timing, and one may expect that they show differential responses to macroeconomic 
conditions. 
We analyze lifetime earnings records to construct the labor force status for every worker. 
We categorize workers as either fully employed, partially retired, or fully retired. We start by 
documenting important changes in the labor force status of older workers at different levels of 
lifetime earnings. Consistent with other studies, we document a general decline in full employment 
of older white males during 1960-1990. Although full employment rates declined for all workers, 
the trends diverge substantially by earnings level. For example, the recent full-time employment 
rate for 60 year olds in the bottom earnings quintile is 1.5 times less than average for their age 
group, and for 65 year olds in the bottom earnings quintile it is 2 times less than their age group 
average. On the other hand, the 65-67 year old workers in the top quintile of earnings exhibit a full-
time employment trend that diverges from the rest of the population. While average full-time 
employment rates stayed relatively stable since 1990, the full-time employment rate for 65-67 year 
old top earners bottomed out in the 1990s and has been rising since, suggesting longer careers for 
this group.  
At the same time, partial retirement has been on the rise across all age and income 
groups. While partial retirement was virtually non-existent for 60-62 years olds in 1960, over the 
past 20 years more than 15 percent of workers in this age group are categorized as partially 
retired. For 65-67 year olds, the recent partial retirement rate is over 20 percent, up from 5-10 
percent in 1960.  
We think that transitions to partial and full retirement should be analyzed as separate 
labor market events, especially given that partial retirement became much more widespread in 
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the past 20 years.  It is often believed that at least some end-of-career events for older workers 
are involuntary and driven by the employer's response to economic conditions. If so, the 
observed shift towards earlier end of careers may leave workers with less control over their 
retirement timing. On the other hand, at least two factors may have contributed to more 
flexibility in retirement timing. First, since 1970, Social Security removed the financial incentive 
to retire at age 65 by introducing a gradual increase in the delayed retirement credit. Second, the 
coincident decline in defined-benefit pension plans may have reduced instances when workers 
face age-specific work disincentives. One can hypothesize that full-time workers and partially 
retired face different degrees of retirement flexibility and, perhaps, different incentives. We, 
therefore, propose to analyze the behavioral responses for these two groups separately.  
We consider the influence of macroeconomic indicators on the timing of partial and full 
retirement for 55-75 year old workers. Our econometric specification is non-parametric in that it 
estimates sensitivity parameters separately for each age. We find robust evidence that flows from 
full-time work into both partial and full retirement rise significantly in recessions. Workers 
around normal retirement age (63-67 years old) are especially sensitive to changes in the national 
unemployment rate. We estimate that a 1 percent rise in the national unemployment rate leads to 
about 1 percent drop in the full employment rate of all 55-75 year olds, with the full employment 
rate among the 63-67 age subgroup dropping as much as 2 percent. The same 63-67 age 
subgroup experiences the largest increase in the flow into partial and full retirement associated 
with recessions. Among the partially retired, the response to a higher unemployment rate differs 
by age: workers younger than 63 extend their partial retirement spell while workers older than 63 
accelerate their transition to full retirement.   
Somewhat surprisingly, we find that high inflation is associated with increased exit from 
the labor force, through partial as well as full retirement. One explanation for this may be that 
during high inflation episodes wages do not keep up with inflation, and lower real wages 
discourage labor force participation.  
Our results also indicate that housing prices do not have a significant effect on retirement 
timing, which is consistent with the modest sensitivity of retirement timing to movements in the 
rate of return on financial assets documented elsewhere (e.g., Bosworth and Burtless, 2011). The 
result suggests that either the wealth effects associated with housing prices are small or that 
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housing price increases are correlated with other macroeconomic variables that encourage labor 
force participation.   
We further investigate if retirement timing of wealthier workers is less sensitive to 
changes in macroeconomic conditions (we use the present value of lifetime earnings as a proxy 
for wealth). Wealthy individuals may have more control over their retirement timing either 
because of their abundant resources or because of more flexible careers in high-paying 
occupations. However, we find that retirement decisions of wealthy workers are only marginally 
less sensitive to fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions. The sensitivity of retirement 
transitions to the unemployment rate and inflation is quite similar across lifetime earnings 
quintiles, with the 63-67 year old age group responding most to changes in the unemployment 
rate. 
The Great Recession generated a renewed interest in how macroeconomic factors 
influence retirement choices. In a closely related study, Bosworth and Burtless (2010) use 
public-use micro data on retired-worker benefit awards published by the SSA as well as the data 
collected in the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Bosworth and 
Burtless relate unemployment rate of prime-age males as well as stock/bond returns on Social 
Security benefit acceptance and labor force exit. They find that while these business cycle effects 
are statistically significant, they are economically small, yet sufficiently large to offset the 
impact of negative wealth shocks in 2007-2009 on old-age labor force participation.   
In another closely related paper, Coile and Levine (2011) use data from the CPS to 
measure labor force participation and Social Security benefit receipt of 55-69 year olds. Their 
main related finding is that a higher unemployment rate decreases labor force participation of 
workers around retirement age, and that the effect is the strongest after age 62. Our results paint 
a more detailed picture as we have several retirement states (partial and full), analyze longer time 
series, use a large set of macroeconomic variables and provide sensitivities by narrowly defined 
age and income groups.  For example, we show that even though a higher unemployment rate 
generally accelerates retirement, workers younger than 63 who are partially retired actually stay 
in partial retirement longer when the unemployment rate is high.  
Much of previous work was constrained by available data. For example, recent studies on 
macroeconomic determinants of retirement timing focus mostly on the Great Recession (e.g., 
Bosworth (2012), Hurd and Rohwedder (2010)). This line of work is certainly informative but it 
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may be hard to generalize from the experience of the Great Recession given particular 
characteristics of this downturn (e.g., financial crisis and high leverage of households). Studies 
using longitudinal data typically cover only a handful of years. For example, SSA’s Retirement 
History Survey data used in Blau (1994) covers only 1969-1979. One may obtain longer time 
series by using synthetic cohorts from the Current Population Survey (CPS; see e.g., Coile and 
Levine 2011) but this can deteriorate measurement of transitions between 
employment/retirement states as different people are used in each cross-section. These data 
constraints limit our understating of retirement choices over the business cycle.   
 The key advantages of our approach relative to previous studies are that (i) CWHS gives 
us access to a complete history of earnings for each worker; (ii) CWHS has much less top-coding 
than public-use micro data published by the SSA; (iii) CWHS provides much longer time series; 
iv) CWHS provide much larger sample sizes so that we can have precise estimates even for 
narrowly defined population groups.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the data we 
use for the analysis of employment/retirement states and transitions across states.  Section 3 
defines employment/retirement states. Section 4 documents trends in retirement timing since 1960. 
Section 5 reports trends in transition probabilities across employment/retirement states. Section 6 
studies how macroeconomic factors such as unemployment rate, inflation rate, and housing prices 
influence transition probabilities between employment and retirement states. We conclude in 
Section 7.  
II. Data 
We use the Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS) dataset.1 This dataset is a result of a 
continuous effort of the Social Security Administration to collect comprehensive data on work 
histories to study work patterns for the entire working life of individuals.2 The CWHS file 
includes longitudinal earnings and Social Security program entitlement information for a 1-
percent sample. The 1-percent samples is selected based on digits of the Social Security number 
(SSN) and is generally considered to be a random sample. The sample is selected from all 
individuals, workers and non-workers, with valid Social Security numbers. There are two parts 
1 Some prior studies that use CWHS are Song and Manchester (2007) and Kopczuk et al. (2010). 
2 More information about CWHS is available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v52n10/v52n10p20.pdf.  
5 
                                                          
of the CWHS—active and inactive files. The active file includes those who have ever reported 
earnings, and the inactive file includes those who have never reported earnings, covered or 
uncovered. 
The CWHS is an analytical master file that provides a complete work and Social Security 
program participation history of the 1-percent sample.  Data elements in the CWHS are taken from 
several Social Security Administration Master files, including the Numident, the Master Earnings 
File (MEF), the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR), and the Supplemental Security Record (SSR). 
The Numident file contains birth and death dates, place of birth, race, and sex. The MEF contains 
annual FICA summary earnings from 1937 to the present. It also contains annual detailed earnings, 
Medicare taxable compensation, and total compensation from 1978 to the present for the U.S. 
population. The earnings records are taken directly from W-2 forms. The MBR file contains 
information related to the administration of the OASDI program, such as application and 
entitlement dates, benefit amounts for all individuals who have ever applied for Title II benefits. 
The SSR file maintains information on all persons who have ever applied for Title XVI SSI 
benefits. 
The CWHS provides the full history of individuals’ annual earnings (both capped and 
uncapped), Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) benefit entitlements, 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program participation, and death records.  Key data 
elements are: 1) demographic characteristics—year of birth, sex, race, and date of death (if any);  
2) annual Social Security covered earnings from 1951 to date; 3) annual uncapped total wages 
from covered or non-covered employment from 1978 to date; 4) annual Social Security taxable 
self-employment income from 1951 to date; 5) number of years employed, first and last years 
employed, and number of quarters of coverage from 1937 to date; (3) OASDI  insurance status; 
(8) OASDI and SSI benefits status and dates of entitlement; (9) Medicare taxable earnings. 
This dataset has several key advantages over previously used data.  First, CWHS has a 
long time series dimension: Social Security earnings are covered since 1937. Accordingly, we 
can use multiple recession episodes to study the cyclical properties of retirement timing. 
Likewise, these long time series will allow us to exploit significant variation in inflation rate 
which is not available to researchers using other data sets (e.g., Survey of Income and Program 
Participation).    
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Second, CWHS tracks workers over their lives and hence has effectively complete data 
on lifetime earnings. In contrast, previously used datasets typically have repeated cross sections 
(e.g., CPS) or short panels with the duration of one to four years (e.g., Survey of Income and 
Program Participation). By using CWHS, we can avoid relying on the synthetic cohort approach 
used in much previous work. 
Third, CWHS is based on administrative records. Numerous studies (e.g., Haider and 
Solon, 2006; Bound et al., 2001; Moore et al., 1997; Bound and Krueger, 1991) report that 
survey measures of income exhibit nontrivial biases when compared with administrative records. 
A disadvantage of the CWHS is top-coding at the Social Security earnings maximum prior to 
1978. (It includes W-2 data after 1978.) Nevertheless, we can extrapolate annual incomes in 
censored cases from the quarter in which SSA limits were reached (see Kopczuk et al., 2010).3 
Fourth, CWHS has records for millions of workers, which is a much larger sample than a 
standard dataset such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), SIPP, CPS, or Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CE). The massive size of CWHS allows us to study narrowly defined 
groups of the population without having to make parametric assumptions or sacrificing precision 
of the estimates. This aspect is particularly important for us since we focus on workers 
approaching retirement and the size of this population group is rapidly shrinking with age.  
While CWHS is a random one percent sample of Social Security numbers and thus is 
nationally representative, we use several filters to minimize selection effects potentially affecting 
retirement choices of individuals. First, we restrict our sample to white males since the racial and 
gender composition of labor force, occupations, etc. has changed dramatically over time. By 
focusing on white males, we minimize the effects of such changes in labor force participation 
and employment. Second, we restrict the sample only to individuals who have at least five years 
of continuous earnings above $5,000 (in 1984 dollars). This filter removes observations with 
irregular working histories. Finally, we set earnings to zero in the year of death to eliminate any 
confusion of reduced earnings in the years of death.   
The main downside of using administrative data like CWHS is that we have limited 
information in demographics and other characteristics of workers or employers. For example, 
CWHS does not have information on the educational attainment of workers or hours of work. 
While one would obviously want to condition on many demographic characteristics in addition 
3 See also the treatment of censored Social Security earnings data in House et al. (2008). 
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to race and gender, this constraint is not necessarily binding. Economic theory suggests that the 
history of earnings may be a sufficient statistic summarizing a variety of individual’s 
characteristics. In part, this theoretical prediction motivates our analysis of behavioral responses 
of retirement timing to macroeconomic conditions by quintiles of life-time earnings.   
III. Definition of full and partial retirement 
Our analysis utilizes information in the individual earnings records to measure the extent of labor 
force participation. Our definition of retirement is based on changes in earnings. Since about 15 
percent4 of individuals keep working even after claiming Social Security benefits, this approach 
offers more flexibility compared to the definition of retirement as benefits claiming age.  
An individual is considered working full time (denoted state 𝐹) until his real earnings 
permanently decline to less than 50 percent of his lifetime maximum annual earnings.5 Anyone 
whose future annual earnings are less than 50 percent of their lifetime maximum and more than 
$5,000 (constant 1984 dollars) is considered partially retired (state 𝑃). As soon as a person’s 
earnings permanently drop below the $5,000 floor, this person is entering full retirement (state 𝑅). 
By construction, retirement age is the last age when the earnings exceed the floor, and partial 
retirement age is the last age when the earnings exceed 50 percent of lifetime maximum. Put 
differently, retirement is defined as the last continuous spell of non-employment before the 
individual’s death, and partial retirement (if any) is the spell of employment at income not 
exceeding 50 percent of lifetime maximum that immediately precedes retirement. Consequently, 
retirement states are ordered: individuals never transit from retirement back to either partial 
retirement or full-time work, and they never go from partial retirement back to full-time work. 
Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical life-cycle earnings profile and the corresponding retirement 
states.  
The $5,000 cutoff is based on the historical record of minimum wages in the U.S. 
Specifically, we assume that a person is not retired if he earns more than the product of the 
federal minimum wage rate and 1,000 hours of work, which roughly corresponds to a 40-hour 
work week over 6 months or approximately a 20 hour work week over 12 months. While there 
has been some variation in the real minimum wage since the inception of minimum wages, the 
4 See Friedberg, 2000, Table 2 
5 We deflate nominal earnings with the Consumer Price Index into constant 1984 dollars.  
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resulting threshold earnings fluctuate around $5,000 per year. We prefer using a fixed threshold 
rather than a threshold that varies with the minimum wage rate because nominal minimum wage 
rates were revised periodically rather than continuously and the discreet nature of these revisions 
can create episodes where we observe spurious flows into retirement due to movements in 
minimum wage rather than due to macroeconomic forces.6  
Earnings records for younger workers who are still alive at the end of the sample period 
are truncated. If such an earnings record ends with a period of long-term unemployment, our 
procedure may miscatergorize the unemployment event as partial or full retirement. To address 
the potential effects of the truncation, we shorten the sample to exclude observations for 2006-
2010 in our robustness checks. 
The classification of states into full employment, partial retirement and full retirement are 
similar to classifications in previous work. For example, Blau (1994) considers full employment, 
partial retirement, and out-of-labor force,7 and Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) compare several 
definitions of full and partial retirement. The main difference from previous studies lies in what 
information we use to classify individuals into states. Previous studies typically use hours of 
work, self-reported status, or the timing of when workers start to collect retirement benefits, 
however, we observe none of these characteristics in the CWHS, and use earnings instead.8 A 
key advantage of classification based on earnings is that earnings effectively combine intensive 
and extensive margins of labor market participation.  
IV. Trends in retirement timing  
Figure 2 depicts shares of white male workers by retirement status for 1960-2010 for a few age 
groups. The figure shows the trend toward lower labor force participation during the 1970s and 
1980s, a phenomenon that is well documented in the labor economics literature (e.g., Anderson 
et al, 1999). Another important trend is the rising prevalence of partial retirement among older 
workers. Many workers appear to depart their career jobs well before reaching their normal 
retirement age and transition into so-called “bridge jobs” with substantially lower earnings prior 
6 We have experimented with the cutoffs based on actual minimum wages and found similar results.  
7 Most studies do not differentiate between partial and full retirement.  
8 In principle, one could merge CWHS with other SSA’s databases and link the histories of earnings to the timing of 
when workers start to collect retirement benefits. However, as we discussed above, workers have been ending full 
employment well before they can claim retirement benefits and hence using the official timing of claiming benefits 
may be misleading.  
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to taking full retirement. Partial retirement was virtually non-existent for 60-62 year olds in the 
1960s. The share of partially retired 60-62 year olds rose to 15 percent by 1990 and has stayed 
relatively stable ever since. Partial retirement is even more prevalent among 65-67 year old 
workers. The share of partially retired 65-67 year olds rose dramatically during 1960-1990 and 
topped 20 percent in the last 20 years of the sample. This finding is consistent with Giandrea et 
al. (2009) who conclude that “traditional one-step retirement appears to be fading”. 
We analyze the time trends in labor force status in more detail by splitting our sample into 
lifetime earnings quintiles. Specifically, for each individual in our sample, we calculate the present 
value of his earnings between the ages of 25 and 54. We use a 2-percent discount rate for present 
value calculations, but results are similar for other discount rates. The individual is assigned to a 
quintile based on the ranking of his present value of earnings compared to others in the same birth 
cohort. We restrict the ages to 25-54 instead of using all ages because people enter and exit the 
labor force at different times and we do not want to mix the extensive margin of earnings (i.e., how 
many years a person works) with the intensive margin (i.e., how much a person makes per year). 
The first quintile corresponds to the lowest income group and the fifth quintile corresponds to the 
highest income group. By construction, an individual stays in his earnings quintile throughout his 
life.  
Figure 3 illustrates several significant patterns that emerge. Full-time employment rates 
started roughly equal across lifetime earnings quintiles in 1960, but subsequent trends are quite 
different. In particular, the bottom 40 percent of earners (quintiles 1 and 2) exhibit the most 
significant drop in full-time employment. Most strikingly, the full-time employment rate in the 
bottom quintile dropped from almost 1 percent in 1960 to below 0.4 percent in 1990 for 60-62 
year olds and from 0.9 percent to about 0.25 percent for 65 year olds. By contrast, the full-time 
employment rate of 60 year olds in the top lifetime earnings quintile dropped only slightly, from 
0.95 to 0.8 percent. The workers in the top earnings quintile behave differently from the rest in 
another important respect as well. While the full-time employment rate has stayed relatively 
stable for the bottom 80 percent of earners since 1990, it grew substantially for 65-67 year olds 
in the top earnings quintile. One interpretation of this is that workers in the professional 
occupations that presumably populate the highest earnings quintile choose to have longer 
careers. 
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In most years of the sample, the full retirement rate is consistently higher for workers with 
lower earnings. We see that about 50 percent of 60 year olds in the bottom earnings quintile are 
fully retired by age 60. It is interesting to note that the trend towards earlier retirement of males 
during 1960-1990 coincided with the increase in female labor force participation. One 
interpretation of trends towards earlier retirement that we observe is that a dual earner household 
does not have to rely on male income as a sole source of financial support, allowing the man to 
retire earlier. 
Retirement rates have become more similar across earnings quintiles as workers age. The 
upward trends in full retirement over time mostly mirror the downward trends in full 
employment, with the full retirement rate rising most dramatically among the workers in the 
bottom earnings quintile. Figure 3 shows a dramatic rise in the full retirement rate among the 
bottom quintile of the population age 60-62. Importantly, the full retirement rate for 60-62 year 
olds in the bottom quintile kept climbing in the 2000s as their partial retirement rate kept 
dropping, with a substantial uptick during the Great Recession. The permanent exit of these 
workers from the labor force is especially concerning, since this population group is too young to 
qualify for Social Security old age benefits and presumably has little in the way of assets to 
cushion their transition to the retirement benefits claiming phase. This group is more likely to 
claim Social Security old age benefits early, which permanently reduces their lifetime income. 
For example, Bound and Waidmann (1992) report that a substantial portion of workers leaving 
the labor force prior to retirement age receive disability benefits. Thus, the recent upward trend 
in labor force exit of the low income 60-62 year olds may have contributed to the dramatic 
growth in the Social Security disability program (Duggan and Imberman, 2009). 
Partial retirement rates by earnings quintile exhibit somewhat diverging trends. Among the 
60-62 year olds, the workers at the extremes of the earnings distribution have lower rates of partial 
retirement than middle earners. For top earners, the relatively low rate of partial retirement reflects 
the high rate of full-time employment for this group. For the lowest earnings quintile, by contrast, 
the low rate of partial retirement is driven by the high rate of full retirement. All earnings groups 
exhibit rates of partial retirement that rise from 1960 to 1990 and remain relatively stable 
afterwards, with the exception of 65-67 year olds in the bottom quintile. For the latter group, the 
rate of partial retirement has remained relatively low and stable since the early 1970s. The 
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dispersion of partial retirement rates by earnings quintile rises both over time and with workers’ 
age.  
V. Transitions between retirement states 
We study transitions of workers between four states: full employment (𝐹), partial retirement (𝑃), 
full retirement (𝑅) and death (𝐷). Let 𝑃𝑅(𝑆 → 𝑄|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) denote the probability of transitioning 
from state 𝑆 to state 𝑄 conditional on worker’s age and year. Note that by construction of the 
states, 𝑃𝑅(𝑃 → 𝐹|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) = 0, 𝑃𝑅(𝑅 → 𝐹|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) = 0, and 𝑃𝑅(𝑅 → 𝑃|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) = 0 for all ages 
and times. We calculate each probability as follows:  
𝑃𝑅(𝑆 → 𝑄|𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝐴, 𝑡) ≡
∑ 𝟏�𝑖 ∈ 𝑄𝐴𝑡,𝑡 ∩ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝐴𝑡,𝑡−1�𝑖
∑ 𝟏�𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝐴𝑡,𝑡−1�𝑖
 
where i indexes individuals, 𝑆𝐴𝑡,𝑡−1 is the set of people in status 𝑆 at time 𝑡 − 1 and age 𝐴 at time 
𝑡, 𝑄𝐴𝑡,𝑡 is the set of people in status 𝑄 at time 𝑡 and age 𝐴 at time 𝑡, 𝟏(∙) is the indicator function. 
Figure 4 illustrates the transition probabilities, by year, for workers age 60, 62, 65 and 67.  
The probability of remaining in full employment, 𝑃𝑅(𝐹 → 𝐹|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡), remains relatively 
stable over time for 60-65 year olds. By contrast, for 67 year olds, the probability of remaining in 
full employment rises dramatically after 1980. We conjecture that this is evidence of a selection 
effect that strengthens over time: workers who stay attached to the labor force until age 67 are 
increasingly more likely to continue their full employment spell. The selection may arise because 
of health: the less healthy members of the cohort drop out of the labor force early, and those who 
stay employed have better than average health that drives stronger labor force attachment. This 
interpretation is consistent with the diminishing flow from full employment into partial 
retirement 𝑃𝑅(𝐹 → 𝑃|𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 67, 𝑡)  for 67 year olds. The probability of transitioning from full 
employment to partial retirement has been rising over time for other ages as well. For example, 
for 65 year olds, the probability increased from less than 5 percent in the early 1960s to about 10 
percent in the 2000s. For 𝑃𝑅(𝐹 → 𝑅|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡), there is a discernible downward trend for 67 year 
olds but there is not a clear trend for other age groups. Specifically, 𝑃𝑅(𝐹 → 𝑅|𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 67, 𝑡) fell 
from about 20 percent in the early 1960s to about 5 percent in the 2000s, while 𝑃𝑅(𝐹 →
𝑅|𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 60, 𝑡) stayed approximately constant at 2-3 percent.  
The probability of remaining in partial retirement, 𝑃𝑅(𝑃 → 𝑃|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡), rises over time for 
all age groups, meaning that partial retirement spells have been increasing in length. This is 
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consistent with some earlier evidence. For example, Ruhm (1990, Table 2) reports that more than 
40 percent of workers who end their career at age 60-64 spend at least one year in partial 
retirement, and 17 percent spend more than 5 years in partial retirement. The nature of the partial 
retirement might have changed as well. In particular, during the 1960s and 1970s, partially retired 
workers were dying very quickly: the death rate among the partially retired, 𝑃𝑅(𝑃 → 𝐷|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡), 
has been around 0.3. This suggests that early on most transitions to partial retirement were driven 
by health concerns. As bridge jobs after careers end became more common, the composition of the 
partially retired has changed to include an increasing number of healthy bridge job holders. 
Consequently, the death rate among partially retired has dropped over time and converged to the 
population average.9   
Figure 5 presents time series of transition probabilities by income quintile. We observe 
differential trends across age groups for all quintiles so that the dynamics of transition we 
reported on Figure 3 above are not driven by any single income group. The behavior of these 
trends is, by and large, similar across income quintiles. While transition probabilities by quintile 
have more erratic variation than those for the pooled sample, one can discern some 
differentiation by income even within age groups. For example, even though the full 
employment rate for 65-67 year olds in the bottom earning quintile is lower than average (Figure 
3), this group has the highest probability of labor force attachment, 𝑃𝑅(𝐹 → 𝐹).  This pattern 
may arise if there is strong selection by health status: by the time the cohort reaches age 67, the 
less healthy workers have already retired and the remaining ones have a higher probability of 
labor force attachment. The probability of labor force attachment for 65-67 year old workers 
shows an upward trend since late 1970s (Figure 5, column 1, row 3-4). We believe that this may 
be a response to the gradual relaxation of the Social Security retirement earnings test that 
happened during 1978-1999 and affected workers over the age of 65. The retirement earnings 
test withholds Social Security benefits for individuals who continue working after claiming 
benefits and their earnings exceed a certain level called the exempt amount.  The exempt 
amounts were gradually raised for workers older than 65 starting in 1978, strengthening the 
incentive to keep working even after claiming Social Security benefits.  
9 𝑃𝑅(𝐹 → 𝐷|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) and 𝑃𝑅(𝑅 → 𝐷|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) have been declining over time, but the magnitude of these declines was 
very modest (1-2 percent) relative to 𝑃𝑅(𝑃 → 𝐷|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡).  
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VI. Sensitivity of retirement timing to macroeconomic variables  
In the previous section, we document significant movements in the shares of population by 
employment/retirement status as well as in transition probabilities across employment/retirement. 
Visual inspection of the figures may suggest that some of the variation can be caused by business 
cycles. To formally explore this conjecture, we estimate the following econometric specification: 
𝑃𝑅(𝑆 → 𝑄|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) = 𝛼𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛾𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟   (1) 
where, as before, 𝑃𝑅(𝑆 → 𝑄|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑆 to state 𝑄 
(with three states: full employment (F), partial retirement (P), full retirement (R), 𝐵𝐶 is a 
variable measuring the business cycle (which is either the unemployment rate or a dummy 
variable for a recession as defined by the NBER), and 𝑡 is a time trend. Note that we estimate 
specification (1) for each age separately. To provide an “aggregate” measure of the sensitivity of 
retirement timing to business cycles, we also estimate a pooled specification 
𝑃𝑅(𝑆 → 𝑄|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) = 𝛼𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽𝐵𝐶𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑡 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟,   (2) 
where 𝛽 and 𝛾 are constrained to be the same across ages but intercepts can vary with age.  We 
also estimate versions of specifications (1) and (2) without trends or with quadratic trends. The 
estimations are performed for ages ranging between 55 and 75.  Because the error term is likely 
to be correlated across ages and time, we use Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors for 
inference. Figure 6 and Table 1 report the results.10  
VII. Retirement timing and unemployment rate 
The unemployment rate is a major business cycle indicator that impacts labor force status. Our 
results strongly indicate that a high unemployment rate accelerates transitions from full-time 
employment to both full and partial retirement, and that it also accelerates transitions from partial 
to full retirement.  
A 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate results in roughly a 1 percentage 
point decrease in the fraction of 55-75 year-olds working full time. However, the impact of the 
national unemployment rate differs dramatically by age subgroup. For example, the fraction of 
64-67 year olds working full time drops by 2 percentage points when the national unemployment 
rate moves up 1 percentage point. Younger and older workers working full time are not as 
sensitive to the movements in the unemployment rate. A lower sensitivity of older workers to the 
10 Results are similar (Appendix Table 1) if we use a shorter sample (1960-2005) that excludes the Great Recession.  
14 
                                                          
unemployment rate is likely to reflect a selection effect. Fully-employed workers at ages 67 and 
above are probably professionals in good health and in industries which are less sensitive to 
business cycle fluctuations. For example, doctors, lawyers, professors and similar professions are 
typical of this subgroup that continues working well after the typical retirement age.  
The decline in full-time work associated with a higher unemployment rate results in 
accelerated transitions into both partial and full retirement. For 55-75 year olds, each percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate results in a 1.05-fold increase in the flow from full-time 
work into full retirement, a 1.07-fold increase in the flow from full-time work into partial 
retirement and a 1.05-fold increase in the flow from partial to full retirement.11 As Figure 6 shows, 
flows into retirement increase the most among workers around normal retirement age, 64 to 67 
years old.  
Workers who are already partially retired show a differential response to an increase in 
unemployment rate. While workers younger than 63 extend their partial retirement spell when 
unemployment rate is high, 64-75 year olds accelerate their transition into full retirement.  
VIII. Retirement timing and inflation  
While the state of the labor market may be a key determinant of retirement timing, inflation can 
play an important role too. To the extent that household portfolios include assets with nominal 
returns (such as nominal bonds), households approaching retirement can be exposed to 
significant inflation risks. Doepke and Schneider (2006) and Meh and Terajima (2011) show in 
calibrated models that even modest increases in the inflation rate can lead to significant 
redistribution of wealth. Doepke and Schneider (2006) estimate, for example, that with a 5 
percent increase in the price level (i.e., a one-time 5 percent inflation shock) wealthy older 
households in the U.S. can lose between 5.7 and 15.2 percent of GDP in present value terms.  
These wealth losses would be even more dramatic if inflation increases gradually and more 
persistently. The main factor behind these calculations is that older households hold a significant 
fraction of their wealth in assets bearing nominal returns. Although recent financial innovations 
(e.g., inflation-protected bonds) helped to reduce these risks to some extent, inflation risk 
remains an issue. These concerns are reminiscent of events in the 1970s when the SSA and 
retiring workers had to address a number of issues associated with rising and persistent inflation. 
11 Changes in flows are calculated by dividing the regression coefficient by the corresponding transition probability. 
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For example, a series of studies sponsored by the SSA (e.g., Thompson, 1978; Parnes, 1981) 
were specifically concerned with understanding inflation’s effect on accumulated savings of 
retiring households and retirement timing. These previous studies found that while inflation 
created strong incentives for continued labor force participation by older workers, the actual 
response of retirement timing was weak. 
This “inflationary” incentive to postpone retirement may be reinforced by other factors. 
For example, high inflation can indicate a boom when earnings are higher and thence the 
opportunity cost of retirement is higher. In short, one may be led to expect a positive relationship 
between inflation and decisions to stay in the workforce (full employment).  
To assess the sensitivity of retirement decisions to inflation, we augment the baseline 
specification (2) with annual CPI inflation rate. Columns 4 through 6 in Table 1 show the results: 
high inflation reduces full-time work and accelerates transition to partial and full retirement. 
Figure 7 demonstrates that this negative relation is typical and is not dependent on outliers or 
unusual episodes. For example, this surprising result is not driven by the stagflation of the late 
1970s and early 1980s.  
One may argue that the negative relationship between the inflation rate and the full-time 
employment rate reflects a combination of (i) a gradual disinflation in the U.S. economy since 
Volcker’s fight on inflation, and (ii) a gradual increase in the prevalence of partial and full 
retirement. To address this concern, we include time trends as controls but these have no material 
effect on the estimates. In addition, inflation rose over the course of the 1960s and early 1970s, 
while the trend towards more partial and full retirement has been fairly continuous since the 
1960s. This combination of changes in inflation and retirement patterns in the early part of our 
sample is inconsistent with a negative correlation.  
Alternatively, inflation may influence the level of macroeconomic volatility which can 
push workers into earlier retirement. While increased inflation can be related to increased 
macroeconomic volatility in the U.S. (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2011), a decrease in 
macroeconomic volatility induced by declining inflation should induce (not reduce) early 
retirement, because workers facing lower macroeconomic risks should accumulate less 
(precautionary) wealth and hence should be able to retire earlier.  
Another possibility is that inflation marks times that are most conducive to self-
employment, and to the extent that the self-employed fail to report their earnings to SSA, we 
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may observe declining full employment after inflationary shocks. While older workers are more 
likely to be self-employed, the share of self-employed has been gradually declining since late 
1960s and has shown little if any cyclical variation (e.g., Karoly and Zissimopoulos, 2004).  
A plausible explanation of this negative relationship is likely to lie in the nature of how 
nominal wages respond to inflation. Barattieri et al. (2013) and others document that nominal 
wages are more rigid than prices. A rise in inflation is unlikely to be matched by a rise in wages 
of similar size. An inflation shock is likely to reduce real wages and, hence, make retirement a 
more attractive option.  Inflation-indexed benefits of many Social Security programs probably 
reinforce incentives to retire. 
IX. Retirement timing and housing prices 
A significant portion of middle class wealth is in the form of housing equity. One should expect, 
therefore, that movements in housing prices should substantially affect household wealth, which 
may alter decisions about when to retire. We have not found a strong association between 
housing price levels and labor force status transitions, with one exception.  High home prices 
seem to accelerate the flow from partial to full retirement (which is consistent with a wealth 
effect), but have an ambiguous effect on other transitions (Table 1, columns 7-12). This low 
sensitivity of retirement timing to movements in home prices may indicate that (potential) 
retirees do not use their housing wealth as a source of immediate income.  Since retirees are 
more likely to own houses, have lower outstanding mortgages, and receive relatively stable 
income from other sources (SSA benefits, financial savings, part-time work, etc.), they are 
unlikely to face systematic, immediate pressure to capitalize homes in recessions. In other words, 
potential retirees can continue to enjoy the flow of services from their housing and postpone the 
sale of their homes until the housing market improves. This flexibility can rationalize the low 
estimated sensitivity of retirement to housing prices.12  
  
12 We also experimented with including returns on equity and bonds as potential determinants of retirement timing. 
Similar to Bosworth and Burtless (2010), we did not find any strong and robust relationship between returns and 
retirement timing. Results are available upon request.  
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X. Sensitivity of retirement transitions by earnings quintile 
We proceed by estimating specification (2) separately for each lifetime earnings quintile. This 
analysis is interesting for several reasons. First, in the context of the life-cycle model, theoretically 
optimal behavior implies that the present value of lifetime earnings is proportional to wealth at 
retirement. Hence, individuals in the top lifetime earnings quintile should have considerably more 
in retirement wealth (housing, financial assets, and SSA benefits) than individuals in the bottom 
lifetime earnings quintile (some housing, but mostly SSA benefits). One may expect that a higher 
wealth level makes one less sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. This may be because 
individuals with more resources may have more control over their retirement timing and be better 
able to withstand adverse macroeconomic conditions. Besides, income quintiles are likely to reflect 
differences in occupations with varying degrees of career flexibility and control over the retirement 
timing. For example, top income quintile is likely to be populated by professional workers such as 
doctors, lawyers, engineers with flexible work schedules and low risk of unemployment during 
recessions, while the bottom income quintile is likely to be populated with low-education, manual 
workers such as secretaries, clerks, assembly line workers with fairly inflexible work schedules 
(e.g., 40 hour work week) and relatively high risk of unemployment during recessions. The latter 
group is particularly interesting given recent trends in job polarization (see Jaimovich and Sui 
2013) and using disability claims to make transitions to retirement (see Autor and Duggan 2006).  
In short, one may expect large differences in the sensitivity of transition probabilities across 
income quintiles.  
We find (Table 2) some differences in the sensitivities but these differences are not 
statistically significant. For example, in the specification with the linear time trend for the bottom 
income quintile (column 2), the sensitivity of staying in full employment is -0.77 while the 
sensitivity for the top income quintile in the same specification (column 14) is -0.54, which is 
consistent with more insulation from business cycles for the top income quintile. This difference 
is considerable but we cannot statistically reject the null at conventional significance levels that 
these sensitivities are the same. Figure 8 shows that the sensitivity is broadly similar across age 
groups and, in this sense, the result is robust.13 A similar pattern emerges for sensitivity to 
inflation and housing prices although there is some variation across specifications and sometimes 
the differences across income quintiles are statistically significant. For example, high inflation 
13 See also Appendix Figures 1 and 2.  
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appears to be associated with a higher probability of exiting full employment for the bottom 
income quintile than for the top income quintile. In summary, the sensitivity of retirement to 
unemployment, inflation and housing prices is similar across income quintiles.  
XI. Robustness 
In the previous sections, we document that the timing of retirement is sensitive to recessions: 
when unemployment rises, workers are more likely to transition to partial or full retirement. In 
this section, we present a series of checks to establish the robustness of this result. Specifically, 
we examine the sensitivity of retirement timing to alternative measures of business cycles and 
using alternative samples.  
First, the key limitation of our approach to identify the employment/retirement state is 
that it may be sensitive to the end-of-sample truncation. For example, if a worker is laid off in 
the last year of our sample, we classify this worker as retired because we do not observe positive 
or large earnings of this worker. This end-of-sample issue is potentially exacerbated by the fact 
that the Great Recession happens in the end of our sample. Indeed, in the end of the sample we 
observe an increase in transitions to retirement. While this may be a genuine effect of the Great 
Recession, we can separate it from the end-of-sample issue only as more years of data become 
available.  
To address this concern, we re-estimate our baseline specification on the sample that ends 
in 2005. With this shorter estimation sample, we minimize the adverse effects of the end-of-
sample issue because we have additional five years of earnings for each worker and we have 
enough time after 2005 to establish whether a worker returns to full employment. Figure 9 shows 
that results based on this shorter sample are barely changed and, if anything, more precise than 
the results in the full sample.   
Second, the data exhibits trends and one may be concerned that including a linear trend 
can drive our results or, alternatively, that using linear trends does not provide enough flexibility 
in capturing low-frequency variation in transitions. As a check, we experiment with including no 
trends (Figure 10) and including a quadratic trend (Figure 11). None of these modifications 
changes the results materially. 
Third, we use the unemployment rate as a measure of recessionary periods. The 
unemployment rate is the headline rate which is calculated for both men and women of all ages. 
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On the other hand, the retirement hazards are calculated for white males. Since the dynamics of 
unemployment may be different across demographics groups, we examine whether our results 
are sensitive to using unemployment rates for subsets of the population. To control for possible 
differences between men and women, we explore the sensitivity to the unemployment rate for 
males and find no change in the results (Figure 12). In Figure 13, we further narrow the set of 
workers used to calculate the unemployment rate to include only men in prime working ages (25-
54). This alternative rate is likely to minimize feedbacks from retirement to unemployment for 
the 55+ year old group we study. Again, we observe no tangible difference in the results. Finally, 
we use dummy variables equal to 1 for times declared as recessions by the NBER and 0 
otherwise, to measure the state of the economy. Since recessions declared by the NBER may 
cover only fractions of years while the hazard rates are calculated at the annual frequency, we 
experiment with several approaches to measure recessions: (i) a recession dummy variable is 
equal to 1 in a given year if at least one month of that year was in a recession; (ii) a recession 
variable is equal to the fraction of months in recession in a given year. While the scale of the 
estimated sensitivity is not comparable to the sensitivity based on the unemployment rate, the 
qualitative patterns are preserved (Figure 14 and Figure 15).  
XII. Concluding remarks 
This paper analyzed individual earnings histories to document the trends in labor force 
participation of older workers and to investigate how macroeconomic factors influence 
retirement timing. The full retirement rate for white males shows a pronounced increase during 
1960-1990. This increase was especially dramatic for the workers in the bottom lifetime earnings 
quintile: half of bottom earners are out of the labor force by age 60. To the extent that labor force 
exit is correlated with poor health, this increases the potential pool of applicants for disability 
benefits. The increase in the full retirement rate was accompanied by a significant increase in the 
partial retirement rate for all age and earnings groups. Currently, as many as 15 percent of 
workers age 60-62 are partially retired, a phenomenon that was virtually non-existent in the 
1960s. The partial retirement spells have grown longer for all workers.  
Our results indicate that during periods of high unemployment,  transitions into full and 
partial retirement accelerate substantially, with workers around the normal retirement age being 
particularly sensitive to the unemployment rate. Therefore, demand for Social Security old age 
20 
benefits is likely to rise in downturns. As recessions induce a permanent exit of older workers 
from the labor force, one can expect a decline in the employment to population ratio following 
recessions. This response, for example, can help explain persistent declines in employment to 
population ratio in recent recessions, which were characterized by jobless recoveries and 
occurred against the backdrop of an aging population.  
We also find that the behavioral response of retirement to inflation is such that 
inflationary shocks can accelerate retirement. While SSA does not have control over inflation, 
the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) does. We see two key policy implications in this context. 
First, the Fed’s decision on long-term inflation targets can influence retirement choices of the 
aging workforce. Specifically, persistently low inflation should make people work longer and 
help relieve some pressures that the Social Security system is now facing. While the benefits of 
low inflation targets are discussed elsewhere in detail (e.g., Coibion, Gorodnichenko and 
Wieland 2012), we are not aware of the connection between inflation and retirement timing 
established in the previous literature. Second, the Fed often uses the employment to population 
ratio to gauge the health of labor markets. For example, the recent expansionary policies of the 
Fed appear to be motivated by a big decline in employment to population ratio even when the 
unemployment rate fell below 8 percent. To the extent that expansionary monetary policy can 
generate inflation, older workers may retire earlier and thus reduce the employment to population 
ratio, thus calling for even more expansionary policies, which appears to be a counterargument to 
the recent call to raise inflation targets. Analyzing this potentially vicious circle is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but policymakers should be aware of this potential drawback.  
Changes in housing prices are found to have only minor effects on retirement timing, 
suggesting that wealth effects may be modest. Moreover, individuals with different wealth levels 
respond to macroeconomic conditions in very similar ways, which further supports the 
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Figure 2. Share of population by employment status 
 
Notes: the figure plots time series of shares of (living) population by employment/retirement status for selected ages. F denotes full employment, P denotes partial 


































Figure 3. Share of population by employment status by quintile of PV life-time earnings (quintile 5 = top quintile) 
 
Notes: the figure plots time series of shares of (living) population by employment/retirement status and by quintile of life-time earnings for selected ages. The 
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Figure 4. Time series of transition probabilities by age 
 
Notes: the figure plots time series of transition probabilities across employment/retirement states for selected ages. prob_XY denotes the probability of moving 

































































Figure 5. Time series of transition probabilities by age and income quintile 
 
Notes: the figure plots time series of transition probabilities across employment/retirement states for selected ages. prob_XY denotes the probability of moving 
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Figure 6. Response of transition probabilities to unemployment rate, linear trend 
 
Notes: each panel shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY (the probability of transition from state X to state Y) to unemployment rate. The black, solid line 
plots the sensitivity estimated for each age separately as in equation (1). The shaded region is the 95% confidence interval. The red, solid line shows the estimated 
sensitivity of prob_XY to the unemployment rate pooled across ages as in equation (2). The red, dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval for the pooled 

















































































Figure 7. Probability of staying in full employment vs. inflation. Age = 65 
 
Notes: The figure presents a scatter plot of probability of staying fully employed vs. inflation rate for 65 
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Figure 8. Response of transition probabilities by income quintile to UR (unemployment rate), linear trends 
 
Notes: each panel shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY (the probability of transition from state X to state Y) to unemployment rate. Quintile 1 corresponds to 
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Figure 9. Response of transition probabilities to unemployment rate. Estimation sample 1960-2005 (exclude the Great Recession) 
 
Notes: each panel shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY (the probability of transition from state X to state Y) to unemployment rate. The black, solid line 
plots the sensitivity estimated for each age separately as in equation (1). The shaded region is the 95% confidence interval. The red, solid line shows the estimated 
sensitivity of prob_XY to unemployment rate pooled across ages as in equation (2). The red, dash lines shows the 95% confidence interval for the pooled estimate 

















































































Figure 10. Response of transition probabilities to unemployment rate, no trends 
 
Notes: each panel shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY (the probability of transition from state X to state Y) to unemployment rate. The black, solid line 
plots the sensitivity estimated for each age separately as in equation (1), with no trends. The shaded region is the 95% confidence interval. The red, solid line 
shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY to unemployment rate pooled across ages as in equation (2), with no trends. The red, dashed lines show the 95% 

















































































Figure 11. Response of transition probabilities to unemployment rate, quadratic trends 
 
Notes: each panel shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY (the probability of transition from state X to state Y) to unemployment rate. The black, solid line 
plots the sensitivity estimated for each age separately as in equation (1), with quadratic trends. The shaded region is the 95% confidence interval. The red, solid 
line shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY to unemployment rate pooled across ages as in equation (2), with quadratic trends. The red, dashed lines show the 

















































































Figure 12 Response of transition probabilities to unemployment rate for males 
 
Notes: each panel shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY (the probability of transition from state X to state Y) to unemployment rate for males. The black, 
solid line plots the sensitivity estimated for each age separately as in equation (1). The shaded region is the 95% confidence interval. The red, solid line shows the 
estimated sensitivity of prob_XY to unemployment rate pooled across ages as in equation (2). The red, dashed lines shows the 95% confidence interval for the 































































































Figure 13. Response of transition probabilities to unemployment rate for males with ages between 25 and 54 years old 
 
Notes: each panel shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY (the probability of transition from state X to state Y) to unemployment rate for males with ages 
between 24 and 55 years old. The black, solid line plots the sensitivity estimated for each age separately as in equation (1). The shaded region is the 95% 
confidence interval. The red, solid line shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY to unemployment rate pooled across ages as in equation (2). The red, dashed 














































































































Figure 14. Response of transition probabilities to NBER recessions, measure i) 
 
Notes: each panel shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY (the probability of transition from state X to state Y) to NBER recessions measure i), which is 
dummy variable is equal to one in a given year if at least one month of that year was in a recession. The black, solid line plots the sensitivity estimated for each age 
separately as in equation (1). The shaded region is the 95% confidence interval. The red, solid line shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY to the NBER 






































































































Figure 15. Response of transition probabilities to NBER recessions, measure ii) 
 
Notes: each panel shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY (the probability of transition from state X to state Y) to NBER recessions measure ii), which is equal 
to the fraction of months in recession in a given year. The black, solid line plots the sensitivity estimated for each age separately as in equation (1). The shaded 
region is the 95% confidence interval. The red, solid line shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY to NBER recessions measure (ii) pooled across ages as in 




















































































































Table 1. Sensitivity of transition probabilities to macroeconomic factors: 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃(𝑿 → 𝒀|𝒂𝒈𝒆, 𝒕) = 𝜶𝒂𝒈𝒆 + 𝜷𝑿𝒕 + 𝜸𝟎𝒕 + 𝜸𝟏𝒕𝟐 + 𝒆𝒓𝒓𝒐𝒓 
 No Linear Quad No Linear Quad No Linear Quad No Linear Quad 
Trend (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A: 𝐹 → 𝐹  
unemployment rate 
-0.90*** -0.90*** -0.71*** -0.70*** -0.68*** -0.62*** -0.86*** -0.82*** -0.72*** -0.69*** -0.60*** -0.60*** 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) 
inflation    -0.30*** -0.32*** -0.24***    -0.29*** -0.32*** -0.26*** 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)    (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
log(HousePrice)       0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 
      (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Panel B: 𝐹 → 𝑃 
unemployment rate 
0.66*** 0.61*** 0.44*** 0.58*** 0.45*** 0.38*** 0.74*** 0.53*** 0.44*** 0.65*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 
(0.18) (0.08) (0.09) (0.19) (0.06) (0.09) (0.16) (0.10) (0.09) (0.15) (0.07) (0.08) 
inflation    0.12 0.23*** 0.14***    0.16 0.24*** 0.15*** 
   (0.11) (0.04) (0.03)    (0.10) (0.03) (0.05) 
log(HousePrice)       0.04** -0.03** 0.00 0.04** -0.03** -0.01 
      (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Panel C: 𝐹 → 𝑅 
unemployment rate 
0.28** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.20** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.19** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.14* 0.27*** 0.27*** 
(0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
inflation    0.12** 0.05* 0.07**    0.09* 0.05* 0.07** 
   (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)    (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
log(HousePrice)       -0.04*** 0.00 0.00 -0.03*** 0.00 -0.00 
      (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Panel D: 𝑃 → 𝑃 
unemployment rate 
0.64 0.31 -0.61* 1.05 0.15 -0.41 1.41 -0.20 -0.63** 1.59 -0.36 -0.36 
(1.33) (0.52) (0.30) (1.33) (0.66) (0.32) (1.14) (0.52) (0.29) (1.11) (0.65) (0.28) 
inflation    -0.61 0.23 -0.51***    -0.30 0.24 -0.56*** 
   (0.70) (0.29) (0.11)    (0.65) (0.27) (0.11) 
log(HousePrice)       0.33*** -0.19*** -0.02 0.33*** -0.19*** 0.03 
      (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) 
Panel E: 𝑃 → 𝑅 
unemployment rate 
0.76 0.88*** 1.18*** 0.39 0.71* 0.96*** 0.49 1.13*** 1.24*** 0.22 0.96** 0.95*** 
(0.50) (0.29) (0.24) (0.52) (0.38) (0.25) (0.46) (0.27) (0.25) (0.49) (0.38) (0.22) 
inflation    0.56* 0.26 0.59***    0.46* 0.26 0.59*** 
   (0.28) (0.15) (0.09)    (0.26) (0.15) (0.10) 
log(HousePrice)       -0.12** 0.09*** 0.05 -0.10** 0.09*** -0.00 
      (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
Observations 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 
Number of age groups 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: The estimated specification is 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋 → 𝑌|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) = 𝛼𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑡2 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 where X is a vector of macroeconomic factors. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.  
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Table 2. Sensitivity by income quintile 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
No Linear Quad No Linear Quad No Linear Quad No Linear Quad No Linear Quad 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Panel A: 𝐹 → 𝐹 
unemployment rate 
-0.76** -0.77** -0.77*** -0.67** -0.61* -0.62** -0.62*** -0.52*** -0.52*** -0.78*** -0.63*** -0.61*** -0.69*** -0.54*** -0.52*** 
(0.29) (0.27) (0.23) (0.31) (0.29) (0.29) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
inflation -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.50*** -0.28** -0.31*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.39*** -0.37*** -0.21*** -0.30*** -0.17** -0.27*** -0.33*** -0.14** 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) 
log(HousePrice) -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.03* 0.07*** 0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
                
Panel B: 𝐹 → 𝑃 
unemployment rate 
0.60*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.53*** 0.32** 0.32** 0.64*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.71*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.58*** 0.36*** 0.34*** 
(0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.08) (0.10) (0.19) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) 
inflation 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.11 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.17* 0.30*** 0.27*** -0.02 0.17*** 0.08 0.10 0.20*** 0.06 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) 
log(HousePrice) 0.04*** 0.00 -0.00 0.04** -0.01 -0.01 0.05** -0.03** -0.02 0.04* -0.04*** -0.01 0.01 -0.04*** -0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
                
Panel A: 𝐹 → 𝑅 
unemployment rate 
0.26* 0.36** 0.36*** 0.22 0.29* 0.30** 0.08 0.19** 0.20** 0.14 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
inflation 0.14** 0.11** 0.20*** 0.12** 0.09* 0.11** 0.12** 0.06 0.07 0.15** 0.10 0.05 0.12** 0.12** 0.07 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
log(HousePrice) -0.01 0.02** -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.03*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.04*** -0.02* -0.00 -0.02*** -0.02** -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                
Panel A: 𝑃 → 𝑃 
unemployment rate 
1.26 -0.45 -0.45* 0.96 -0.64 -0.73*** 1.80 -0.37 -0.47** 3.13 0.33 0.17 2.14 0.02 -0.05 
(1.04) (0.74) (0.26) (0.99) (0.72) (0.24) (1.22) (0.71) (0.17) (2.03) (1.04) (0.40) (1.27) (0.65) (0.32) 
inflation -0.01 0.46 -0.49*** -0.38 0.36 -0.43*** -0.45 0.54 -0.33*** -1.02 0.77* -0.30** -0.89 0.08 -0.58*** 
(0.64) (0.32) (0.08) (0.51) (0.31) (0.08) (0.63) (0.32) (0.06) (0.77) (0.42) (0.13) (0.58) (0.26) (0.12) 
log(HousePrice) 0.23** -0.22*** 0.04 0.20** -0.21*** 0.02 0.31** -0.24*** 0.02 0.48*** -0.28*** 0.06** 0.40*** -0.14*** 0.06 
(0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.16) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.04) 
                
Panel A: 𝑃 → 𝑅 
unemployment rate 
0.14 0.75 0.75** 0.26 0.94* 0.99*** 0.07 0.84** 0.88*** 0.51 0.99** 1.00** 0.48* 0.77*** 0.77*** 
(0.59) (0.50) (0.30) (0.58) (0.50) (0.27) (0.55) (0.39) (0.22) (0.56) (0.43) (0.42) (0.27) (0.23) (0.23) 
inflation 0.39 0.22 0.67*** 0.45 0.14 0.56*** 0.59** 0.24 0.55*** 1.11*** 0.80*** 0.84*** 0.69*** 0.56*** 0.58*** 
(0.26) (0.19) (0.12) (0.27) (0.19) (0.10) (0.24) (0.14) (0.09) (0.23) (0.26) (0.21) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) 
log(HousePrice) -0.06 0.10*** -0.02 -0.06 0.12*** -0.01 -0.09** 0.10*** 0.01 -0.09** 0.04 0.02 -0.08*** -0.01 -0.01 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Observations 980 980 980 925 925 925 925 925 925 875 875 875 925 925 925 
Number of age groups 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: The estimated specification is 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋 → 𝑌|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) = 𝛼𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑡2 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 where X is a vector of macroeconomic factors. This specification is estimated for 
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Appendix Figure 1. Response of transition probabilities by income quintile to unemployment rate, no trends. 
 
Notes: each panel shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY (the probability of transition from state X to state Y) to the unemployment rate. Quintile 1 
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Appendix Figure 2. Response of transition probabilities by income quintile to UR (unemployment rate), quadratic trends. 
 
Notes: each panel shows the estimated sensitivity of prob_XY (the probability of transition from state X to state Y) to the unemployment rate. Quintile 1 








55 60 65 70 75
age







55 60 65 70 75
age





55 60 65 70 75
age



















55 60 65 70 75
age
PR  to  ur
43 
Appendix Table 1. Sensitivity of transition probabilities to macroeconomic factors: Estimation sample 1960-2005. 
No Linear Quad No Linear Quad No Linear Quad No Linear Quad 
 
Trend 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A: 𝐹 → 𝐹 
unemployment rate 
-0.89*** -0.89*** -0.44*** -0.58*** -0.56*** -0.36*** -0.85*** -0.82*** -0.42*** -0.56*** -0.51*** -0.36*** 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
inflation    -0.35*** -0.36*** -0.20***    -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.17*** 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)    (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
log(HousePrice)       0.02 0.04 -0.04*** 0.01 0.03* -0.02* 
      (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Panel B: 𝐹 → 𝑃 
unemployment rate 
0.66*** 0.63*** 0.28*** 0.52** 0.41*** 0.24*** 0.73*** 0.57*** 0.27*** 0.57*** 0.35*** 0.24*** 
(0.19) (0.08) (0.07) (0.21) (0.06) (0.08) (0.17) (0.10) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.08) 
inflation    0.16 0.25*** 0.11***    0.19* 0.24*** 0.10** 
   (0.11) (0.04) (0.03)    (0.11) (0.03) (0.04) 
log(HousePrice)       0.04 -0.04* 0.02** 0.04* -0.03** 0.01 
      (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Panel C: 𝐹 → 𝑅 
unemployment rate 
0.26** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.14 0.21*** 0.18** 0.19* 0.28*** 0.20*** 0.10 0.21*** 0.18*** 
(0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
inflation    0.13* 0.08** 0.06*    0.10* 0.08** 0.05 
   (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)    (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
log(HousePrice)       -0.04*** -0.00 0.01** -0.04*** -0.00 0.01 
      (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Panel D: 𝑃 → 𝑃 
unemployment rate 
0.93 0.68*** -0.15 1.58 0.69** 0.05 1.65 0.36 -0.12 2.01 0.40 0.05 
(1.45) (0.23) (0.23) (1.50) (0.29) (0.22) (1.19) (0.21) (0.23) (1.18) (0.26) (0.22) 
inflation    -0.72 -0.02 -0.50***    -0.44 -0.04 -0.47*** 
   (0.82) (0.19) (0.11)    (0.74) (0.17) (0.10) 
log(HousePrice)       0.42*** -0.16*** -0.07** 0.41*** -0.16*** -0.03 
      (0.13) (0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) 
Panel E: 𝑃 → 𝑅 
unemployment rate 
0.65 0.75*** 0.80*** 0.05 0.39* 0.58*** 0.37 0.89*** 0.75*** -0.11 0.52*** 0.58*** 
(0.56) (0.24) (0.21) (0.55) (0.19) (0.19) (0.48) (0.21) (0.21) (0.45) (0.17) (0.19) 
inflation    0.68** 0.41*** 0.55***    0.57* 0.42*** 0.49*** 
   (0.32) (0.10) (0.09)    (0.29) (0.10) (0.09) 
log(HousePrice)       -0.16*** 0.07*** 0.10*** -0.15*** 0.07*** 0.05** 
      (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) 
Observations 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 980 
Number of age groups 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Notes: The estimated specification is 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑋 → 𝑌|𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) = 𝛼𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛾0𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑡2 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 where X is a vector of macroeconomic factors. Driscoll and Kraay (1998) 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. Estimation sample is 1960-2005.  
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